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Abstract An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where
a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders
(a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is
an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This
result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185,
1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all
firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of
Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there
is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–
185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while
in our paper all firms are equally efficient.
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